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I. INTRODUCTION 
There were seventeen international investment agreements (“IIAs”) 
signed around the world in 2012, and each one of them contained some 
provision relating to the protection of the environment.1 In comparison, 
no investment treaty signed before 1985, and fewer than ten percent of 
treaties signed between 1985 and 2001, contained any reference to the 
environment at all.2 Environmental language has become increasingly 
1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013 GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT, at 102, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2013, 
U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.D.5 (2013). 
2 Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Environmental Concerns in International Investment 
Agreements: The ‘New Era’ Has Commenced, but Harmonization Remains Far Off, COLUM. FDI 
PERSP., Aug. 15, 2011, at 1. 
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common in bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), and to an even greater 
degree in other IIAs, such as free trade agreements (“FTAs”).3 The legal 
implications of the integration of environmental law and norms into 
investment law treaties have yet to be fully explored, though there has 
been significant literature on trade and environment “linkages.” This 
paper seeks to give a U.S.-centric overview of the recent trends in the 
inclusion of environmental provisions in BITs and FTAs. In particular, 
this paper focuses on the recognition and integration of multilateral 
environmental agreements (“MEAs”) into the text of investment 
agreements. 
The analysis of this integration takes two approaches. In the first, the 
international legal implications of the inclusion of MEAs into other 
international treaties is aided by the concept of “legalization,” first 
introduced in 2000 by Abbot et al., in which the “hard” or “soft” nature 
of a legal norm is determined by the degree to which it possesses three 
characteristics: obligation, precision, and delegation. The second 
approach of the paper asks how and why these MEAs came to be 
prioritized in the trade negotiations of the United States. The answer to 
the question is found by applying theories of international negotiation, 
primarily Robert Putnam’s theory of “two-level games,” to the history 
of the development of environmental provisions of trade and investment 
agreements. 
Section II continues the introduction of the topic by presenting the 
two main economic theories concerning the relationship between 
liberalized trade and environmental impact: the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve and the pollution haven hypothesis. It then presents the evolution 
of environmental provisions in U.S. FTAs, starting with the NAFTA 
side agreements in 1994 and culminating in the inclusion of MEAs in 
the U.S.-Peru FTA in 2009. 
A. Legalization 
Section III introduces the concept of legalization in more detail and 
uses it to describe the implications of the integration of multilateral 
environmental agreements into the body of a free trade agreement. This 
section looks, with a focus on the practices of the United States, at some 
of the more innovative “linkages” between the environment and trade 
3 Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Environmental Concerns in International Investment 
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and investment law. Some of these linkages push environmental norms 
farther in the direction of “hard” legalization than ever before. They 
increase the obligation upon states to create and enforce environment 
laws; they often describe, with great precision, just how these laws are 
to be implemented; and they increase the amount of delegation given to 
third parties to determine compliance and resolve disputes. Some 
thought is given to whether the institutions of international economic 
law are truly the best fora for the enforcement of environmental norms. 
Section IV focuses on changes in the Environment Article of the 
2012 U.S. Model BIT and their potential implications for international 
investment arbitration. The final example presented of the merging of 
environmental and investment law is the recent trend toward the 
inclusion of Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) provisions in both 
BITs and FTAs. Throughout its first half, this paper uses an 
analysis of the changes in the characteristics of obligation, precision, 
and delegation to describe the legal implications of these “linkages” 
between environmental and economic law. 
B. Negotiation and process 
Section V seeks to answer the questions: ‘Why these provisions?’ 
and ‘Why these treaties?’ First, a close look at the policy and politics 
behind these agreements is presented, with a focus on FTAs and the 
“fast track” authority they require for a successful negotiation. Applying 
theories of international negotiation, most significantly Putnam’s “two-
level game,” this section identifies the factors that account for the trade 
and environment linkage outcomes outlined in the preceding sections. 
These factors include: trade-offs resulting from linkage of international 
issues; coalitions formed among domestic groups; transnational 
coalitions formed between allied groups from different states at the 
negotiation table; whether the agreement is bilateral or multilateral; and 
the relative size of the domestic “win-sets.” Reference to Putnam’s 
framework can be used to explain why the enforcement of the 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements were included in the U.S.-Peru 
Trade Agreement and why their enforcement in the upcoming Trans-
Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) is one of the largest remaining areas of 
unresolved conflict in the negotiation. 
Section VI looks ahead to mega-treaties such as the TPP, and applies 
the lessons learned from Section V to explain the battles currently being 
fought in secret over its environmental agenda. In this section, the 
author also questions whether, empirically, environmental commitments 
made under economic treaties have had positive effects. 
Section VII concludes. 
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II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN U.S. TRADE AGREEMENTS 
A. Theory Behind Trade and Environment Linkages 
Concern over the relationship between trade and the environment, 
and the theoretical literature that resulted from it, was sparked in the 
early 1990s by two major developments in international law. The first 
was the debate over the creation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) and its predicted impacts.4 While the greatest 
American opposition to NAFTA came from organized labor, 
environmentalists also raised fears that unregulated polluting industries 
would spring up and destroy Mexico’s natural resources.5 The second 
event was a GATT panel ruling that the U.S. had violated its obligations 
by banning imports of Mexican tuna, because the fish were caught in a 
manner that harmed dolphins.6 The GATT laid the foundation for what 
in 1993 was going to become the World Trade Organization, and there 
was concern that international trade law would infringe upon the 
sovereignty of individual nations to determine their own domestic 
environmental regulation.7 
To this day, there are two main theories regarding the effect of 
liberalized trade on the environment: the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(“EKC”) and the pollution haven hypothesis. The Kuznets Curve refers 
to the upside-down U-shaped relationship between income inequality 
and levels of income first hypothesized in 1955: as poor countries 
become rich, inequality among the population grows at first, but then 
begins to decrease past a certain threshold.8 In 1993 two economists 
proposed that this relationship also existed between income and 
environmental degradation.9 The EKC describes the fact that richer 
4 See KEVIN P. GALLAGHER, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: MEXICO, NAFTA, AND 
BEYOND (2004). 
5 Id. at 1; Judith Adler Hellman, Mexican Perceptions of Free Trade: Support and Opposition 
to NAFTA, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 193, 194 (Ricardo 
Grinspun & Maxwell A. Cameron eds., 1993). 
6 Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R-39S/155 (Sept. 3 
1991). The ruling circulated in 1991 but was not adopted. For a discussion of this case, see 
Mexico Etc. v. US: ‘Tuna-Dolphin’, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/e 
nvir_e/edis04_e.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). See also Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the Trade-
Environment Divide, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 114 (2001). 
7 Esty, supra note 6, at 113–14. 
8 Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, XLV Am. Econ. Rev. (1995). 
9 Gene Grossman & Alan Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade 
Agreement, in THE MEXICO-US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 13, 15, 31 (1993); GALLAGHER, supra 
note 4, at 4–5. 
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countries (like the United States) can afford to prioritize environmental 
protection. 
The pollution haven hypothesis refers to the fact that it is cheaper to 
operate industry (and pollute) in a country that lacks environmental 
regulation. As a result there is an economic incentive for industry to flee 
from rich countries into poor countries once barriers to trade are 
removed.10 
This paper holds that these two theories are embedded in much of the 
debate around the role of environmental provisions in trade agreements 
to this day. Many environmental groups either oppose free trade entirely 
or insist that agreements must only be signed with countries whose 
domestic regulations have been elevated to sufficient standards. Pure 
free-tradists argue that, “trade-generated wealth is a more powerful 
vehicle for change than forcing standards on a nation.”11 
This latter view echoes the sovereignty concerns that arose out of the 
GATT Tuna-Dolphin decision. Opponents of environmental provisions 
in trade agreements—including potential FTA partners of the United 
States—”fear that developing countries could be required to implement 
rules that are inappropriate for their level of development.”12 
B. Development of Environmental Provisions in Free Trade Agreements 
What follows is a brief overview of the changes in the environmental 
provisions of U.S. Trade Agreements, staring with NAFTA in 1993 and 
ending with a detailed description of the legal obligations entailed by 
the U.S.-Peru FTA, concluded in 2006. For the purposes of comparison, 
a brief sampling of environmental provisions in non-U.S. FTAs follows. 
The policy and politics guiding these developments are presented later 
in Section V. 
1. Early U.S. Practice 
NAFTA was the first United States trade agreement to explicitly 
include environment provisions. Partially in response to the controversy 
that had developed over the GATT Tuna/Dolphin dispute, NAFTA 
reproduced the GATT Article XX environmental exceptions within its 
text. In addition, the treaty included a list of three multilateral 
10 KYM ANDERSON & RICHARD BLACKHURST, THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES 8 
(1992). 
11 Charan Devereaux et al., Fast Track/Trade Promotion Authority, in CASE STUDIES IN US 
TRADE NEGOTIATION, VOLUME 1: MAKING THE RULES 208 (2006). 
12 Id. at 190. 
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environmental agreements that were meant to be given precedent over 
NAFTA in the event that a conflict of norms arose in a dispute, 
“provided that the MEA is implemented in the least NAFTA-
inconsistent manner.” 13  These treaties were: the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(“CITES”); the Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(“Montreal Protocol”); and the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.14 
This recognition of even a limited set of MEAs was a significant 
departure from the previous FTA that the U.S. had signed with Israel in 
1985, in which the obligations under the FTA were given clear 
precedence over all other agreements: 
The Parties affirm their respective rights and obligations with respect 
to each other under existing bilateral and multilateral agreements. . . . In 
the event of an inconsistency between provisions of this Agreement and 
such existing agreements, the provisions of this Agreement shall 
prevail.15 
The strength and relevance of NAFTA’s inclusion of environmental 
exceptions and reference to privileged MEAs has been widely debated. 
Environmental groups take issue in particular with the way in which 
dispute settlement tribunals established under the Investment Chapter of 
NAFTA have interpreted and enforced international environmental 
norms. In the case of Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) tribunal 
engaged in no discussion of the environmental provisions provided 
under NAFTA before ruling against Mexico’s “environmental” 
measures.16 In the S.D. Myers v. Canada award, the arbitrators found 
that while Canada was attempting to fulfill its obligations under The 
Basel Convention on the Movement of Transboundary Wastes (one of 
13 MARY TIEMANN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE , NAFTA: RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND 
INITIATIVES (Mar. 2000), http://fpc.state.gov/6143.htm. 
14 Id.; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; The Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M 1550 [hereinafter 
Montreal Protocol]; The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 676 U.N.T.S 126 [hereinafter Basel 
Convention]. 
15 United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Isr., art. 3, Apr. 22, 1985, Hein’s No. 
KAV 7204. 
16 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 
30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002). 
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the three protected MEAs), it should have done so in a manner that was 
more consistent with NAFTA investment rules.17 
Most of NAFTA’s environmental provisions are contained within a 
side agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation (“NAAEC”). The NAAEC contains a dispute resolution 
chapter, though the dispute resolution process differs significantly from 
the process contained in the main agreement.18 Under the NAAEC, one 
state party may allege that another state party has failed to enforce a 
domestic environmental law and convene an arbitral panel to investigate 
the violation. The panel may then impose a “monetary enforcement 
assessment,” capped at twenty million dollars, or .007% of the value of 
the trade between the two parties in the most recent year, and create an 
“action plan” for the violating state.19 One unique aspect of this fine is 
that it is paid directly to the Environmental Commission established 
under the NAAEC and then spent as the Commission sees fit to improve 
“environmental law enforcement” in the violating state.20 These dispute 
settlement provisions have never been invoked by any of the three state 
parties (See Section VI).21 
2. Second Phase of U.S. FTAs 
The next generation of U.S. FTAs merged the environmental side 
agreements into the main text and created full and separate 
Environmental Chapters within the treaties.22 Free trade agreements 
with Australia (2005), Morocco (2004), Bahrain (2004), and Oman 
(2009) all establish dispute resolution for environmental matters in the 
form of state-state consultation, contain strengthened provisions for 
public participation, and note the importance of multilateral 
17  S.D. Myers v. Canada, UNCITRAL, First Partial Award, ¶ 221 (Nov. 13, 2000), 
http://italaw.com/documents/SDMeyers-1stPartialAward.pdf. 
18 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 4–Sept. 
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAAEC]. 
19 Kevin W. Patton, Note, Dispute Resolution Under the North American Commission on 
Environmental Cooperation, 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 87, 106 (1994) (citing NAAEC Annex 
34(1)). 
20 Id. (citing NAAEC Annex 34(3)). 
21 GALLAGHER, supra note 4, at 77. 
22 United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, ch. 19, June 6, 2003, Hein’s No. 
KAV 6375 [hereinafter U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement]; United States-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S-Sing., ch. 18, May 6, 2003, Hein’s No. KAV 6376 [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore 
Free Trade Agreement]. See generally Sikina Jinnah & Julia Kennedy, Environmental Provisions 
in US Trade Agreements: A New Era of Trade-Environment Politics, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & 
INT’L REL. 95, 98 (2011). 
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environmental agreements.23 In addition to these developments, the 
Chile FTA (2004) and Dominican Republic-Central America FTA 
(“DR-CAFTA”) (2006) create Environmental Affairs Councils to 
oversee the cooperation on environmental programs and also establish 
rosters of environmental experts to serve as panelists in disputes arising 
under the Environment Chapter.24 Dispute settlement procedures that 
could result in tariff suspensions are provided if a state was found to 
have failed to enforce domestic environmental laws. 
3. Recent U.S. Free Trade Agreements 
On May 10, 2007 a Bipartisan Trade Deal was reached between U.S. 
Congressional and Senate leadership in consultation with the U.S. Trade 
Representative.25 The May 10 Agreement, which is discussed in more 
detail later in the paper, was necessitated by the fact that there were four 
pending free trade agreements that would not be approved by the newly 
Democratically-controlled Congress without certain pro-labor and 
environment amendments.26 The Agreement effectively ratified the old 
Congressional trade policy agenda that had been outlined in the Trade 
Promotion Authority special legislation in 2002.27 Under the trade deal, 
all U.S. FTAs must “incorporate a specific list of [seven] multilateral 
environmental agreements,” all of which the United States is a signatory 
to.28 The non-derogation obligation for domestic environmental laws 
was amended from a “strive to” to a “shall” obligation.29 The most 
23 United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, Hein’s No. 
KAV 7141 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2005); United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Morocco, June 15, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 7206 (entered into force Sept. 1, 2004); United States-
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 14, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 6866; Agreement 
on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 19, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 8673 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 2009). 
24 The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, art.17.5, 
Aug. 5, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 7157; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 22, art. 
19.03. 
25  U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL (2007) 
[hereinafter USTR TRADE FACTS], http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/200 
7/asset_upload_file127_11319.pdf. 
26 David A. Gantz, The “Bipartisan Trade Deal,” Trade Promotion Authority and the Future 
of U.S. Free Trade Agreements 6, 12 (Ariz. Legal Stud., Discussion Paper No. 08–16, 2008). 
27 Trade Promotion Authority, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801–13 (2006) (expired Jun. 30, 2007). See also 
Gantz, supra note 26, at 3. 
28 USTR TRADE FACTS, supra note 25, at 3 (“The list, with abbreviated titles, is as follows: 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), Montreal Protocol on Ozone 
Depleting Substances, Convention on Marine Pollution, Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Convention (IATTC), Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, International Whaling Convention 
(IWC), and Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).”). 
29 Id. at 2. 
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significant modification from past policy was the stipulation that all 
FTA environmental obligations “will be enforced on the same basis as 
the commercial provisions of our agreements—same remedies, 
procedures, and sanctions.” 30  The May 10 Agreement explicitly 
encouraged the use of trade sanctions instead of fines in the 
enforcement of environmental obligations—including those obligations 
arising under the listed MEAs.31 
There are four FTAs that have been completed since the creation of 
the Bipartisan Trade Deal: Peru, Colombia, South Korea, and Panama. 
Each contains reference to this list of seven “covered agreements.”32 
Under the text of the treaties, actions taken in pursuit of compliance 
with the MEAs are not merely protected in the event that they conflict 
with an investment or trade law norm. Rather, the FTAs mandate the 
implementation of the listed MEAs. The Environmental Chapter overall 
is linked quite tightly with the main Dispute Settlement Chapter of the 
FTAs. While the U.S.-Chile FTA in 2004 was the first agreement to 
permit dispute settlement mechanisms for the derogation from a state’s 
own domestic environmental laws, these new FTAs expand the 
application of dispute settlement to the entire Environment Chapter.33 
The four most recent FTAs provide for broad use of trade sanctions in 
disciplining states that derogate from their domestic environmental law 
or from the list of MEAs.34 
4. U.S.-Peru FTA 
The 2009 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (“TPA”) has gone 
the farthest in implementing what Jinnah and Morgera call “innovations 
in trade-environment linkages.”35 Its Environment Chapter contains a 
30 Id. at 2–3. 
31 Id. at 2–3. 
32 United States-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-South Korea, art. 20-A, Mar. 15, 
2012, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-
text; United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, annex 18.2, Apr. 12, 2006, 
Hein’s No. KAV 8674 (entered into force Feb. 1, 2009) [hereinafter U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion 
Agreement]; United States-Panama Trade Promotion, U.S.-Pan., annex 17.2, June 28, 2007, 
Hein’s No. KAV 9546; United States-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Colom., annex 18.2, 
May 15, 2012, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombi 
a-fta/final-text. 
33 U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 22. 
34 DEP’T OF STATE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Nov. 20, 2007), 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/96035.pdf. 
35 Sikina Jinnah & Elisa Morgera, Environmental Provisions in American and EU Free Trade 
Agreements: A Preliminary Comparison and Research Agenda, REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L 
ENVTL. L. 324, 329 (2012). 
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unique article on biodiversity, it provides for expansive dispute 
settlement for a number of environmental conflicts, and it contains an 
Annex on Forest Governance that authorizes unprecedented U.S. 
supervision of the enforcement of Peruvian law. 
Article 18.11 on Biological Diversity contains mostly weak, non-
binding obligations. The Parties “recognize the importance of . . . 
conservation” and “remain committed to promoting and encouraging the 
conservation . . . of biological diversity.”36 The Parties also “recognize 
the importance of public participation and consultations, as provided by 
domestic law” and “will enhance their cooperative efforts . . . through 
the [Environmental Affairs Council]” created under the Environment 
Chapter.37 What is remarkable about this article is that the provisions are 
quite similar to the commitments created under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (“CBD”), a treaty to which the United States 
declined to become a party.38 Jinnah reports that in a private interview a 
U.S. government representative admitted that there were political 
concerns that “the U.S. not effectively ratify the CBD through an 
FTA.”39 
The U.S.-Peru TPA’s Annex on Forest Sector Governance governs 
specifically the implementation and enforcement of a particular MEA: 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Flora and Fauna (“CITES”).40 The eight-page Annex, contained within 
the Environmental Chapter of the TPA, is explicitly subject to Dispute 
Settlement under Chapter 21 of the TPA.41 The document outlines in 
detail the steps that Peru alone must take in order to combat illegal 
logging practices. These steps include passing new regulations on illegal 
logging, establishing export quotas on mahogany, and increasing 
criminal penalties for violations of forestry laws.42 In addition, the 
Annex requires that Peru allow officials from the United States to 
participate in the auditing and verification of compliance of Peruvian 
wood exporters.43 
These enforcement measures are stronger than any provided for 
under CITES itself. Indeed, Peru has been a signatory to CITES since 
36 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 32, art. 18.11. 
37 Id. 
38 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, Hein’s No. KAV 3747. 
39 Jinnah & Morgera, supra note 35, at 329 (citing to a personal interview with a U.S. 
government representative in January 2010). 
40 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 32, annex. 18.3.4. 
41 Id. art. 21.2. 
42 Id. annex. 18.3.4. 
43 Id. 
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1975 and had sat comfortably in noncompliance for three decades prior 
to the signing of the TPA.44 The United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”) has made it clear that the TPA “commits Parties to adopt, 
maintain and implement laws and all other measures to fulfill 
obligations under covered multilateral environmental agreements, 
including CITES. Along with other obligations in the Environment 
Chapter . . . this obligation is subject to the PTPA’s dispute settlement 
procedures and enforcement mechanisms.”45 
The entry into force of the U.S.-Peru TPA was only the beginning of 
the United States’ involvement in Peruvian environmental law. In order 
to come into compliance with the provisions of the TPA (not just the 
Environment Chapter), Peru was required pass nearly one hundred new 
laws.46 In order to meet the eighteen-month timeline stipulated under the 
TPA, the Peruvian Congress granted President Alan García the 
equivalent of “fast-track” authority to rapidly enact a block of 
legislation known as the “99 decrees.” 47  “[T]wo teams of U.S. 
government lawyers” as well as representatives from the USTR flew to 
Peru to help with the drafting of these laws, including forestry laws and 
changes to indigenous land ownership.48 This assistance in the drafting 
of legislation was also accompanied by millions of dollars in “trade 
capacity building assistance” from the U.S. government. 49  These 
changes were met with a mixed response from Peruvian citizens. 
Environmental activists claimed that some of the legal changes would 
hurt, rather than help forest preservation, making it easy for indigenous 
groups to sell off their lands for the establishment of biofuel 
plantations.50 
44 Jinnah & Kennedy, supra note 22, at 102–03; List of Contracting Parties, CONVENTION ON 
INT’L TRADE ENDANGERED SPECIES WILD FAUNA & FLORA, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/partie 
s/chronolo.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
45 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW UNITED STATES-PERU 
TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT 21 (2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/ 
2559. 
46 Erik Wasson, New Peru FTA Decrees Anger Civil Society Over Labor, Environment, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 4, 2008. 
47 Jinnah & Kennedy, supra note 22, at 105. 
48 Wasson, supra note 46. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.; TRAVIS MCARTHUR & TODD TUCKER, PUBLIC CITIZEN, A YEAR AFTER 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PERU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, U.S. AND PERU LEFT WITH BROKEN 
PROMISES AND NO NEW TRADE MODEL (2010), http://www.citizen.org/documents/perufta-
oneyear.pdf. 
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Indeed, by June 2009 demonstrations by indigenous peoples and 
farmers against the unwanted “jungle laws” had become violent.51 One 
confrontation resulted in the deaths of thirty-four police and civilians.52 
In response, the Peruvian legislature voted to repeal the two decrees 
intended to change the regulation of forest wildlife.53 President García 
issued a statement admitting that; “his government had made a mistake 
by failing to consult with indigenous communities before passing [ten] 
decrees that modified Peru’s legal and regulatory framework on access 
to and use of natural resources in the country’s Amazon jungle 
region.”54 
As of August 2010, Peru had failed to meet a deadline for 
implementing further legal reforms established under the Forest 
Annex.55 In response, USTR representatives traveled to Lima to discuss 
compliance, meeting not only with counterparts in the executive branch, 
but also with members of Peru’s congress to discuss a new forestry law, 
which a government source described to Inside U.S. Trade as an 
“unusual” step.56 Environmental groups in the U.S. issued statements 
that they would expect the U.S. to initiate dispute settlement 
proceedings under the TPA unless Peru made “significant progress” on 
its forestry obligations.57 A U.S. House of Representatives Ways and 
Means Committee member supported the use of formal dispute 
settlement.58 
5. Environmental Provisions in Non-U.S. FTAs 
Jinnah and Morgera provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
European Union approach to the incorporation of MEAs in FTAs, 
which offers a useful tool for comparison. 59  The E.U. Peru and 
Colombia (“EU-COPE”) FTA also contains a list of seven “covered” 
multilateral agreements, to which “[t]he Parties reaffirm their 
51 Ángel Páez, PERU: Congress Probes Massacre; Prime Minister to Quit, INT’L PRESS 
SERVICE (June 16, 2009), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47248. 
52 Id. 
53 Ángel Páez, PERU: Government Partly Backs Down in Standoff with Native Groups, INT’L 
PRESS SERVICE (June 19, 2009), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47297. 
54 Id. 
55 Kirk Sending Senior USTR Official to Lima After Peru Misses FTA Deadline, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE, Aug. 6, 2010. 
56 Matthew Schewel, U.S. Presses Peru to Approve Controversial Forestry Law by Mid-
December, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 19, 2010. 
57 Id. 
58 Kirk Sending Senior USTR Official to Lima After Peru Misses FTA Deadline, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE, Aug. 6, 2010. 
59 Jinnah & Morgera, supra note 35, at 329–33. 
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commitment to effectively implement in their laws and practices . . . .”60 
The E.U. list includes more of the “major” MEAs currently in force, 
covering chemicals, hazardous waste, biodiversity, and climate change, 
but leaving out tuna, whaling, and Antarctic marine life. EU-COPE 
creates a dispute settlement procedure to cover its Trade and Sustainable 
Development Chapter, which is distinct from the dispute settlement 
provided for under the rest of the Agreement.61 Under this procedure, 
the Parties “shall make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory 
resolution of the matter through dialogue and [state-state] 
consultations.”62 Disputes unable to be resolved through consultation 
may be brought in front of a panel of environmental experts, who may 
issue a non-binding report with recommendations.63 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENT LINKAGES 
The preceding section described the growth of the scope of the 
environmental provisions in free trade agreements. The following 
section investigates the international legal implications of such growth. 
These provisions have been increasing the number of state obligations 
as well as strengthening their ability to be enforced—they have been 
following a course of “legalization.” 
A. The Concept of Legalization 
In 2000, Abbot et al. surveyed recent developments in international 
affairs and noted that institutions and norms had been following a trend 
of “legalization”—where subject areas previously dominated by 
diplomacy and politics were increasing governed by new international 
institutions with legal bite.64 The growing use and effectiveness of the 
WTO, the European Court of Human Rights, and the International 
60 Free Trade Agreement between the E.U. and Its Member States, of the One Part, and 
Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, art. 270.2, Jun. 26 2012, available at http://trade.ec.europa. 
eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf [hereinafter EU-COPE FTA]. For the Agreements 
see Montreal Protocol, supra note 14; Basel Convention, supra note 14; Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119; Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208; Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 
U.N.T.S. 148; Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. 10, 1998, 2244 U.N.T.S. 337. 
61 EU-COPE FTA, supra note 60, art. 285. 
62 Id. art. 283. 
63 Id. art. 284. 
64 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000). 
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were all part of this 
trend.65 One key example cited was that U.S. courts had recently upheld 
the constitutionality of the use of binding dispute resolution under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), declining to find 
that the determinations of an international tribunal violated U.S. 
sovereignty.66 
Abbot et al. define “legalization” as “a particular set of characteristics 
that institutions may (or may not) possess.”67 These characteristics are 
aligned along three axes: obligation, precision, and delegation. 68 
Obligation refers to the legally binding nature of the commitment in 
question. 69  This means that there are procedures in place—under 
international law or domestic law—to analyze whether or not a state or 
other actors are in compliance.70 Precision refers to the detail with 
which the obligated conduct is described.71 Delegation refers to the 
degree to which third parties have been granted the authority to 
determine and enforce the compliance as well as the power to resolve 
disputes. 72  The amount by which each of the properties are, in 
combination, maximized or minimized results in “hard” or “soft” 
legalization of a norm.73 These labels are not meant to be binary; 
institutions can be located on an “identifiable continuum from hard law 
to varied forms of soft law.”74 
The rise of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) and free trade 
agreements (“FTAs”) can be described in these terms. In terms of 
obligation, these treaties create binding legal rules rather than expressly 
non-legal standards. The rules contained within them are precise rather 
than vague principles. The method for resolving disputes under these 
treaties is, with some exception, binding dispute resolution delegated to 
an independent tribunal. The international legal community has, for the 
most part, embraced this legalization trend. The number of BITs on 
record has multiplied over the years such that there were 2,857 in force 
65 Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385, 
385 (2000). 
66 Id. (citing Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 
1999)). 






73 Id. at 401–402. 
74 Id. at 418. 
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at the end of 2012.75 Nearly all states have at least one BIT. In addition, 
there are 339 “other” international investment agreements, such as free 
trade agreements with investment chapters.76 There were fifty-eight new 
investor-state claims initiated under such investment treaties in 2012.77 
This paper looks not at the increasing use of BITs and FTAs, but 
rather at the expansion in their scope. Specifically of interest is the 
incorporation of environmental norms in explicitly legal terms into the 
treaty texts. International economic law fora, namely the WTO and the 
investment arbitration system, have had great success in the hardening 
of all three legalization properties: obligation, precision, and delegation. 
States, with a few infamous exceptions, have typically complied with an 
ICSID award against them.78 This success has prompted many proposals 
for the expansion of subject areas that the dispute adjudication bodies 
are granted the competence to resolve. Many advocates bemoan the lack 
of teeth in other international treaties and support borrowing the 
adjudication and enforcement mechanisms of international economic 
law.79 Noah Feldman, for example, has proposed that state violators of 
human rights should be brought in front of the WTO, judged, and 
punished through trade sanctions. 80  Some proposals argue that the 
expansion of the competence of arbitrators and the types of claims heard 
in investment arbitral tribunals is necessary to counteract investor-bias.81 
To other observers of the investment law system, it seems inevitable 
that questions of environmental law will arise out of investment 
disputes, so the hierarchy of international norms ought to be made more 
explicit.82 
75 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 1. 
76 Id. at xix. 
77 Id. at 110. 
78  Dany Khayat, Enforcement of Awards in ICSID Arbitration, INT’L ARB. PERSP. ON 
ENFORCEMENT, Winter 2012, at 15, available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/b 
3dde3c6-d268-49a6-840d-5022ca866c0b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d94cda79-2ee8-44 
7c-b205-54ca37390ece/11986.PDF#page=18. 
79 Jorge E. Viñuales, The Environment Breaks into Investment Disputes 5 (2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125209. 
80 Noah Feldman, How Guantanamo Affects China: Our Human Rights Hypocrisies, SALON 
(May 19, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/05/19/how_guantanamo_affects_china_our_human_ 
rights_hypocrisies/ (arguing that “. . . economic interdependence can be leveraged to help manage 
real political conflict.”). 
81 Kate Supnik, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing 
Interests in International Investment Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 343, 343–44, 346–47 (“Amending the 
ICSID Convention to include a provision allowing tribunals to consider environmental, public 
health, and labor concerns would serve as a positive step toward establishing an investment 
regime that maximizes the interests of investors and host states alike”). 
82 Lise Johnson, International Investment Agreements and Climate Change: The Potential for 
Investor-State Conflicts and Possible Strategies for Minimizing It, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 11147 
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B. The Legalization of Multilateral Environmental Treaties via FTAs 
Through the mechanism of a Free Trade Agreement, the United 
States has been able to effectively enforce, in the territory of another 
state, a multilateral environmental treaty that on its own had much 
weaker compliance provisions. Through this process, which Jinnah 
labels “regulatory transference,” the three characteristics of legalization 
were each substantially increased. 83  Peru took on even greater 
obligations with regard to the regulation of mahogany exports than were 
required by CITES alone.84 In the realm of precision, Peru agreed not 
only to implement very specific monitoring and regulation of its 
rainforests, but also to enact specific laws co-written by the United 
States regarding forest governance. The third characteristic of 
delegation was perhaps maximized to the greatest degree. The 
compliance or non-compliance of Peru with the CITES provisions that 
were incorporated into the FTA can now be determined through 
international arbitration under the FTA Dispute Settlement mechanisms. 
The United States can issue trade sanctions against Peru if it fails to 
meet its CITES-like obligations. It has become clear in the years since 
the entry into force of the FTA that the conflict never needs to reach the 
formal dispute resolution stage for the mandates of the FTA to exercise 
great influence over Peru’s behavior.85 Indeed, U.S. officials have made 
several trips to Peru to demonstrate exactly how to implement and 
enforce the new land management laws. They are permitted under the 
FTA to conduct their own unannounced audits of timber exports, and 
the U.S. Forestry Service maintains an office in Lima “devoted to 
supporting Peru’s efforts to implement the Forest Annex.”86 When Peru 
failed to meet an FTA-imposed deadline regarding the passage of new 
forestry regulation, officials from the U.S. government had the power to 
meet with members of the Peruvian congress and assist them in meeting 
that deadline.87 
(2009); Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the 
Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345 (2007). 
83 Sikina Jinnah, Strategic Linkages: The Evolving Role of Trade Agreements in Global 
Environmental Governance, 20 J. Env’t & Dev. 191, 194 (2011). 
84 Jinnah & Morgera, supra note 35, at 330–31. 
85 Wasson, supra note 46. 
86 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED STATES-PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT: 
STRENGTHENING FOREST SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN PERU 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013-Progress-under-the-Forest-Annex.pdf. 
87 Kirk Sending Senior USTR Official to Lima After Peru Misses FTA Deadline, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE, Aug. 6, 2010. 
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C. Implications of Legalization of Multilateral Environmental Treaties 
The first concern raised is the ability of an economic superpower to 
set the environmental agenda of a developing nation through the carrot 
and stick coercion of a free trade agreement. Lack of sovereignty over 
natural resources is an ancient grievance of developing nations against 
the developed world.88 Interestingly, the first article of the Environment 
Chapter of the U.S.-Peru TPA itself provides that both Parties recognize 
the “sovereign right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic 
environmental protection and environmental development priorities, and 
to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and policies.”89 
The Forestry Annex and its process of implementation seem to cut 
against these principles. Indeed, Peru has spent significant resources and 
manpower implementing the exact forestry reforms that it had been 
comfortable ignoring under CITES.90 The intense public opposition to 
the changes made in indigenous land rights through the implementation 
of the FTA demonstrates that these reforms may be what the American 
people think is important—but not the Peruvian people. 
One might ask, how much do Americans really care about the illegal 
trade in mahogany? Is it a significant enough priority to the American 
people to warrant U.S. Trade Representatives flying to Lima to oversee 
the drafting of forestry laws? Or, is it possible that there are a small 
number of individuals and NGOs with lobbying power who care a great 
deal about the preservation of the mahogany species and the United 
States Congress does not care much either way? These questions are 
addressed again in Section V, which investigates the domestic politics 
and coalitions that worked toward the inclusion of FTAs in the May 10 
Agreement. 
All seven MEAs are treaties to which the United States is a party, but 
they are also all treaties with which the U.S. is comfortably in 
compliance. From the perspective of an environmentalist, the seven 
treaties contained within the EU-COPE FTA represent a collection of 
the most “major” MEAs. Several of these treaties are ones that the U.S. 
has not yet ratified. The Rotterdam Convention on Chemicals has been 
ratified by 153 states and the E.U., but not the U.S.91 The Basel 
88 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No.17, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 15 
(Dec. 14, 1962). 
89 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 32, art. 18.11. 
90 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-161, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: OFFICE 
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ITS MONITORING OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS 11–12 (2014). 
91 Status of Ratifications, ROTTERDAM CONVENTION, http://www.pic.int/Countries/Statusofra 
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Convention has been ratified by almost every state other than Haiti and 
the United States.92 The United States, South Sudan and Andorra are the 
only states not to have ratified the Kyoto Protocol (though Canada 
renounced its ratification in 2011).93 
Some have hailed the inclusion of MEAs in recent U.S. FTAs as the 
assertion of the role of the United States as a global environmental 
leader. It is true that by subjecting compliance with the MEAs to the 
scrutiny and enforcement of the dispute settlement, the U.S. has given 
them far more “legal bite” than any of the treaties had on their own. 
This new generation of FTAs advances the legalization of these 
environmental norms far beyond the mere recognition first given to 
them under NAFTA. Indeed, in the introduction to Legalization and 
World Politics, the authors pointed to NAFTA’s environmental 
provisions as an example of a weakly legalized institution, writing, 
“NAFTA’s transgovernmental Commission on Environmental 
Cooperation ‘is too weak to create the pressures necessary to cause 
substantial redrafting of environmental legislation’ and is useful largely 
as a device for disseminating information about effective domestic 
environmental law.”94 In contrast, the U.S.-Peru FTA, as we have seen, 
resulted in concrete changes to Peruvian environmental law. 
However one must ask what exactly we are gaining by having the 
United States pick and choose the environmental priorities of the rest of 
the world, or at least the states it can coerce through economic fora. Had 
Peru attempted to use the FTA to impose climate change mitigation 
legislation upon the United States through a linkage with the Kyoto 
Protocol, it certainly would have failed. As Goldstein et al. point out, 
“[t]o the degree that legalization represents rules that do bind at least 
some governments, the realist explanation is clear: legal rules emanate 
from dominant powers and represent their interests.”95 
A second and related concern about this method of “hardening” 
international environmental law has to do with transparency and the 
democratic process. Peruvian President García was able to push though 
controversial land reform laws without stakeholder consultation because 
tifications/tabid/1072/language/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
92 Paul Hagen, It’s Past Time for the United States to Ratify the Basel Convention, 27 ENVTL. 
F. 51, 51 (2010); Parties to the Convention, BASEL CONVENTION, http://www.basel.int/Countries/ 
StatusofRatifications/PartiesSignatories#a-note-1 (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
93 TERESA M. THORP, CLIMATE JUSTICE: A VOICE FOR THE FUTURE 239 (2014). 
94 Goldstein et al., supra note 65, at 391 (citing Kal Raustiala, International “Enforcement of 
Enforcement” Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 721, 760–61 (1996)). 
95 Id. at 391. 
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he had been given a form of “fast track” authority to enact legislation 
necessary to comply with the mandate of the TPA. Public Citizen has 
accused the USTR of assisting García in making an “end-run around 
[his] constituents.”96 They point to a statement made by U.S. Trade 
Representative Susan Schwab regarding the Peruvian decrees: 
What free trade agreements enable a country to do, and I am 
talking about the United States and its trading partner, is 
implement reforms that we should probably be doing anyway 
but that could be difficult politically. Part of our effort is 
working with Peruvian authorities to help them get there.97 
This situation, in which the domestic negotiators are played against the 
international negotiators, is described well by Robert Putnam’s theory 
of “two-level games,” and will be applied in Section V.98 
It is important to note that the power of trade treaties to circumvent 
the democratic process is present in the United States in addition to its 
developing country trading partners. This power can be seen in the 
concerns raised regarding the Biodiversity Article contained with the 
Environment Chapter of the U.S.-Peru FTA. 99  The Article, while 
composed of hortatory language, replicates many of the goals outlined 
in the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”). Every U.N. state 
member is a party to the CDB, with the exception of two: Andorra and 
the United States.100 While the Senate declined to ratify the CBD in 
1994,101 they did subsequently ratify many of its provisions through the 
ratification of the Peru FTA.102 
Further implications of the inclusion of MEAs in U.S. free trade 
agreements, particularly their relevance to dispute resolution provided 
under investment chapters, will be explored in the discussion of 
environmental provisions in recent bilateral investment treaties below. 
96 MCARTHUR & TUCKER, supra note 50, at 4. 
97 Id. (citing Lucien Chauvin, Peru, U.S. Officials Work on Implementing Bilateral FTA, Aim 
for Jan. 1 Effective Date, BNA, June 3, 2008) (emphasis added). 
98 Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 
INT’L ORG. 427 (1988). 
99 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 32, art. 18.11. 
100 List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/information 
/parties.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
101 DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.defenders.org/publications/the_u.s._a 
nd_the_convention_on_biological_diversity.pdf. 
102 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 32, art. 18.11. 
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IV. LINKAGE OF INVESTMENT LAW AND ENVIRONMENT 
Many states have included positive environmental provisions in their 
bilateral investment treaties or the investment chapters of free trade 
agreements. 103  A report released in 2011 by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) provides a 
comprehensive survey of these provisions.104 The authors divide the 
wide variety of approaches into seven categories: 1. General references 
to environmental concerns in preambles; 2. Right to regulate—reserving 
policy space for environmental regulation; 3. Reserving policy space 
with respect to certain treaty provisions; 4. Precluding non-
discriminatory regulation as a basis for claims of indirect expropriation; 
5. Environmental matters and investor-state dispute settlement; 6. Not 
lowering standards—discouraging relaxation of environmental 
standards to attract investment; and 7. General promotion of progress in 
environmental protection and cooperation. 105  The 
Belgium/Luxembourg-Colombia BIT takes a different approach and 
removes environment-related disputes entirely from investor-state 
dispute resolution. 106  Notably, the 2004 Canadian Model Foreign 
Investment Protection Agreement was the first to directly incorporate 
general exceptions akin to GATT Article XX and the BIT practice of 
many other countries has followed suit.107 
This paper now turns to present the changes to the Environment 
Article that were made in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and analyze their 
implications for international investment law. 
A. The U.S. Model BIT 
In April 2012 the United States government released the newly 
revised version of its model bilateral investment treaty. It was a long 
time in the making—the previous version of the model BIT had been 
released in 2004. Overall, the two versions differed only slightly, 
103 Gordon & Pohl, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Agreement Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, on the one hand, and the 
Republic of Colombia, on the other hand, on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, art. 8, Apr. 2, 2009, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/T 
reatyFile/342. 
107  Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements, in 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 354, 357–58 (Marie-Claire 
Cordonier et al. eds., 2011); see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008–
June 2009, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements, 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/0 (2009). 
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disappointing both industry and advocacy groups who had been pushing 
for more significant changes.108 The new model BIT did, however, 
contain a substantially strengthened Investment and Environment 
Article which increases commitments to environmental protection in 
several ways. The 2004 model provided that “each Party shall strive to 
ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from [its 
environmental laws]
 
in a manner that weakens or reduces the 
protections afforded in those laws, as an encouragement for the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in 
its territory.”109 In the new 2012 model, the phrase “shall strive to 
ensure” was replaced with “shall ensure,” and an additional 
commitment not to “fail to effectively enforce” environment laws was 
added.110 A new clause starting the Article was added, stating that the 
Parties “recognize that their respective environmental laws and policies, 
and multilateral environmental agreements to which they are both 
party, play an important role in protecting the environment.” The Labor 
and Investment Article similarly references a commitment to the 
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) Declaration.111 This is the first 
time a revised U.S. model BIT has made explicit reference to external 
multilateral agreements in these areas. 
While the 2004 model had provided for state-state consultation if one 
Party believed the other to be derogating from domestic environmental 
law,112 the new consultation provision was expanded to apply to the 
entire Environment Article and a thirty-day response requirement was 
added.113 Finally, the revised model confirms that each Party “may . . . 
provide opportunities for public participation” regarding any matter 
arising under the Environment Article. 114  These relatively weak 
enforcement provisions, while stronger than those under the 2004 
108 Mark Kantor, The New U.S. Model BIT: “If Both Sides Are Angry With You, You Must Be 
Doing Something Right”, 9 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT 47, 47 (2012). 
109 2004 MODEL BIT: TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF [COUNTRY] CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL 
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT 15 (2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.p 
df [hereinafter 2004 Model BIT]. 
110 2012 MODEL BIT: TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF [COUNTRY] CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL 
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT 17 (2012), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20f 
or%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf [hereinafter 2012 MODEL BIT] (emphasis added). 
111 Id. 
112 2004 MODEL BIT, supra note 109. 
113 2012 MODEL BIT, supra note 110, at 18. 
114 Id. 
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Model, disappointed environmental NGOs. 115  Many advocates had 
hoped for environmental obligations that were enforceable by means of 
binding dispute resolution, similar to the approach taken in recent U.S. 
free trade agreements. 116  Meanwhile, industry groups questioned 
whether this new expansion of environmental protections might be 
“counterproductive.”117 
B. Legalization of International Environmental Law via BITs 
Without a binding enforcement mechanism, it is unclear how 
changing “strive to ensure” to “shall ensure” will impact the legalization 
effect on the enforcement of environmental laws. Similarly, the 
implications of the explicit recognition of multilateral environmental 
agreements in the text of the BIT have not been fully explored. One 
possibility is that this change in language will increase the success of 
either environmental counterclaims or necessity defenses brought by 
states in investment arbitrations.118 The admissibility of counterclaims is 
typically determined by “the scope of the jurisdictional and choice of 
law clauses as well as the facts of the case.”119 Viñuales argues, “An 
environmental counter-claim could be brought only if the applicable 
treaty directs the arbitral tribunal to apply domestic (environmental) 
law.”120 However, the text of the U.S. Model BIT also provides that “the 
tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty 
and applicable rules of international law.”121 Does the explicit mention 
of the importance of multilateral environmental agreements within the 
text of the BIT make them “applicable rules of international law” in the 
event of an investment dispute that implicates the environment? The 
acknowledgment of these multilateral agreements must signal to the 
arbitrators that there is a potential conflict of norms of international 
law—not just merely a discrepancy between the mandates of the BIT 
and the defendant state’s environmental law. 
To the extent that any of these results lead to the elevation of the 
norms created under MEAs to the level of those obligations created 
115 Kantor, supra note 108, at 47. 
116 Sarah Anderson et al., The New U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Public Interest 
Critique 2, 4–5 (May 9, 2012), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/BITResponseMay12.pdf. 
117 Kantor, supra note 108, at 47 (citing the Emergency Committee for American Trade 
(“ECAT”)). 
118 For more on this topic, please see JORGE E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). 
119 Viñuales, supra note 79, at 10. 
120 Id. 
121 2012 MODEL BIT, supra note 110, at 33. 
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under the BIT, the MEAs themselves benefit from an increase in 
legitimacy and legalization. 
C. Implications in Investment Arbitration for the Inclusion of MEAs: 
Environmental Rights of Actions for Investors 
It is possible that the increased recognition of the importance of both 
international and domestic environmental law in the text of a BIT could 
lead to successful environmental claims as direct investment claims.122 
Viñuales presents such a case, where a host State’s non-enforcement of 
its own environmental laws as well as international treaties has been 
alleged to be a violation of the investment protections granted under a 
BIT.123 Peter Allard v. Government of Barbados is a case currently in 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) arbitration under the Canada-Barbados BIT. In the 
Notice of Dispute, the Canadian investor alleges that Barbados’ acts and 
omissions violated the Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance, the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as the 
Marine Pollution Act of Barbados.124 These acts and omissions allegedly 
resulted in Barbados breaching the Fair and Equitable Treatment and 
Full Protection and Security guarantees of the BIT.125 In addition, the 
complaint asserts that the environmental degradation that resulted from 
Barbados’s acts and omissions led to a de facto expropriation of the 
investment in the eco-tourism facility.126 The Canadian investor seeks 
compensation in the amount of $34 million.127 
This opportunity for environmental claims to be brought under BITs 
in the form of investment claims has not been lost on the environmental 
advocacy community in the United States. The Advisory Committee 
Report submitted in 2009 to the Department of State contained 
recommendations for the upcoming Model BIT rewrite. In it, the 
Committee asked that the USTR confirm that “certain types of nonprofit 
acquisitions abroad have the character of an ‘investment’” and that “the 
Model BIT [should] accord BIT protections to such acquisitions.”128 The 
122 See generally Viñuales, supra note 79. 
123 Id. at 6. 
124 Notice of Dispute, ¶¶ 10–13, Peter A. Allard v. Barbados (Sept. 8, 2009), available at 
http://graemehall.com/legal/papers/BIT-Complaint.pdf. 
125 Id. ¶ 21. 
126 Id. ¶¶ 17–20. 
127 Id. ¶¶ 10–13. 
128  REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 
REGARDING THE MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 1 (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.usch 
amber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/grc/BITReviewReportandAnnexFinalVersion.pdf. 
126 Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 33:102 
Committee sought explicit confirmation that an ecological preservation 
would “enjoy BIT protections regardless of whether the acquirer had an 
expectation of profit.”129 Under the definitions of the 2012 Model BIT, 
“investment” is defined as “every asset that an investor owns or 
controls, . . . that has the characteristics of an investment, including such 
characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources. . . . 
Forms that an investment may take include: (a) an enterprise . . .”130 An 
“enterprise” is earlier defined as “any entity constituted or organized 
under applicable law, whether or not for profit . . . including a . . . 
trust.” 131  It appears that at least under the U.S. Model BIT, 
environmentalists who establish forest preserves and nature sanctuaries 
are permitted to bring a claim should their rights as investors be 
violated. 
D. Corporate Social Responsibility 
An environmentally related provision that has been occurring with 
more frequency in both investment treaties and trade agreements is one 
that asks for countries to promote Corporate Social Responsibility 
(“CSR”) in some way. The Chile-U.S. and the U.S.-Singapore FTAs 
(2004) both contain articles within their Environment Chapters entitled 
“Principles of Corporate Stewardship”: 
Recognizing the substantial benefits brought by international 
trade and investment as well as the opportunity for enterprises to 
implement policies for sustainable development that seek to 
ensure coherence between social, economic and environmental 
objectives, each Party should encourage enterprises operating 
within its territory or jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate 
sound principles of corporate stewardship in their internal 
policies, such as those principles or agreements that have been 
endorsed by both Parties.132 
Similarly, the Canada-Benin BIT, signed in 2013, provides that each 
Party “should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or 
subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally 
recognized standards of corporate social responsibility in their practices 
129 2012 MODEL BIT, supra note 110, at 2. 
130 Id. at 3. 
131 Id. at 2. 
132 U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 22, art. 19.10; U.S.-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement, surpa note 22, art. 18.9. 
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and internal policies.”133 The Investment Chapter of the Canada-Peru 
FTA contains identical language; its preamble replicates it again.134 
Norway’s 2007 Model BIT (later shelved) went a step further and 
required the Parties to “agree to encourage investors to conduct their 
investment activities in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and to participate in the United Nations 
Global Compact.”135 Hepburn and Kuuya point out that a comment 
released along with the Model BIT makes it clear that this CSR 
provision is meant to change the behavior of countries that have not 
already committed to the OECD guidelines.136 
What legal weight do these Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) 
provisions really carry? The BITs and FTAs themselves are treaties that 
create legally binding obligations upon their State parties. CSR 
generally applies to corporate entities, not states, and its mandates are 
typically voluntary. At most, states are obligated to “encourage” the 
adoption of legally non-binding standards. 
However, a legalization analysis shows that these may not be 
completely empty provisions. In terms of obligation, its legal 
characteristics are low. However, in terms of precision, the OECD 
Guidelines can themselves be quite specific. Corporations are 
encouraged to maintain an environmental management system that 
includes monitoring impacts, adopting efficient technologies, and 
providing environmental education to employees and customers.137 It is 
also evident that Norway was attempting to use its BIT as a tool to get 
its treaty partners to agree to soft law principles that they would not 
have otherwise accepted. As Abbot et al. note, “[o]ver time, even 
nonbinding declarations can shape the practices of states and other 
actors and their expectations of appropriate conduct, leading to the 
133 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of 
Benin for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-Benin, art. 16, Jan. 6, 
2013, 2014 Can. T.S. No. 13, available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/m 
aecd-dfatd/FR4-2014-13.pdf. 
134 Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Peru, art. 810, May 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/peru-perou/peru-
toc-perou-tdm.aspx?lang=eng. 
135  KINGDOM OF NORWAY, DRAFT VERSION: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF 
NORWAY AND [   ] FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS (2007) art. 32, 
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1031.pdf (emphasis added). 
136  Jarrod Hepburn & Vuyelwa Kuuya, Corporate Social Responsibility and Investment 
Treaties, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 602–05 (2011) (citing 
Comments on the Model for Future Investment Agreements, § 4.6.3, INVESTMENT TREATY ARB., 
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/NorwayModel2007-commentary.doc.). 
137  ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES 43–44 (2011), available at www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines. 
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emergence of customary law or the adoption of harder agreements. Soft 
commitments may also implicate the legal principle of good faith 
compliance, weakening objections to subsequent developments.”138 The 
inclusion of CSR provisions in BITs and FTAs are an example of the 
“blurring” that can occur between “hard” and “soft” law. These 
provisions have at the very least moved CSR principles farther along the 
“continuum” from soft to hard law. 
V. WHY THESE PROVISIONS IN THESE TREATIES? A LOOK AT 
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PROCESS 
The previous sections of this paper were devoted to an exploration of 
how international environmental law, its players, and its enforcement, 
has been changed by the evolution of free trade agreements and bilateral 
investment treaties. This next section seeks to answer the questions: 
‘Why these provisions?’ and ‘Why these treaties?’ Why is detailed and 
aggressive protection for forests mandated, instead of clean water—or 
climate regulation? How do these provisions find themselves in trade 
and investment agreements at all? Why are these issues not simply dealt 
with in multilateral environmental agreements? 
This section looks more closely at the policy and politics behind 
these agreements, with a focus on FTAs and the “fast track” legislative 
authorization they require. Applying theories of international 
negotiation, most significantly Putnam’s “two-level game,” this section 
identifies the factors that account for the trade and environment linkage 
outcomes outlined in the preceding sections. These factors include: 
trade-offs resulting from linkage of international issues; coalitions 
formed among domestic groups, as well as transnational coalitions 
formed between allied groups from different states at the negotiation 
table; whether the negotiation was bilateral or multilateral; and the 
relative size of the domestic “win-sets.” Reference to Putnam’s 
framework can be used to explain why enforcement provisions 
governing the seven Multilateral Environmental Agreements were 
included in the U.S.-Peru Trade Agreement and why MEA enforcement 
in the upcoming Trans-Pacific Partnership is one of the largest 
remaining areas of unresolved conflict in the negotiation. The next 
section provides a brief history of domestic politics with regard to the 
U.S. trade agenda. 
138 Abbott et al., supra note 64, at 412. 
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A. Background on Process 
In order to understand the role that Congress plays in international 
trade negotiations, it is necessary to look at the development of Trade 
Promotion Authority (or Fast Track) legislation. While the executive 
branch has constitutional power to negotiate international trade 
agreements, Congress must ratify these agreements if statutory 
implementation is required to bear them out.139 Starting in 1934, the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act delegated authority to the president 
to negotiate tariff reduction with other nations.140 This authority was 
expanded under the Trade Act of 1974 to cover “non-tariff trade 
barriers,” though consultation requirements between Congress and the 
President were added.141 The 1974 Act was also the first instance of the 
“fast track” process, whereby Congress agreed to consider the 
implementing legislation required under trade agreements in an 
expedited fashion.142 Through this bargain, Congress bound itself to an 
up-or-down vote on the required legislation (with no amendments 
considered) in exchange for being consulted throughout the negotiation 
process. 143  Fast track authorization continued with uninterrupted 
renewals until 1993.144 
1. 1990s: The Fight Over Trade Promotion Authority 
In the early 1990s, domestic constituent concern about the negative 
effects of trade liberalization made the renewal of fast track authority 
more controversial. Labor and environmental groups, and the House 
Democrats they supported, were its strongest opponents. In 1991, a 
renewal of fast track authority was sought by President Bush in 
anticipation of the negotiation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”). Labor coalitions were firmly opposed to a free 
trade agreement with Mexico and lobbied hard against the renewal of 
fast track authority. 145  Environmental groups “were split on fast 
track”—with some giving conditional support if the agreement included 
139  See CAROLYN C. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21004, TRADE PROMOTION 
AUTHORITY AND FAST-TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS: MAJOR 
VOTES (2011). 
140 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 73–316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). For more 
information see SMITH, supra note 139, at 1. 
141 SMITH, supra note 139, at 1. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) 
AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 6 (2014). 
145 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 195. 
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environmental protection.146 The 1991 renewal eventually passed after a 
long battle by the Bush Administration, with the House vote divided by 
party lines (two-thirds of all Democrats voted to oppose it).147 
The main agreement of the NAFTA text had already been signed 
(though not ratified), when Bill Clinton defeated George Bush in the 
1992 presidential election. Rather than re-opening the text to 
negotiation, the Clinton Administration, in deference to the priorities of 
its party, began negotiating side agreements on labor and environment 
with Mexico and Canada.148 The two side agreements that resulted could 
reportedly be tolerated by House Republicans because “neither of them 
really had [enforcement] sanctions involved.” 149  While some 
environmental groups remained loyal to the NAFTA side-agreement 
compromise, certain Democratic Congressmen that had voted to renew 
fast track in 1991 opted against NAFTA in the final vote.150 Partly out of 
disappointment with the substance of the NAFTA environmental 
agreements, House Democrats were reinvigorated to condition future 
fast track authority on more substantive requirements for environment 
and labor.151 
Following the acceptance of NAFTA, it was the Republican Party’s 
turn to oppose fast track renewal. The Clinton administration put 
forward a fast-track draft that required labor and environmental 
obligations to be included in future trade agreements. These 
requirements were to be enforced by trade sanctions. 152  Citing 
opposition from their constituents in the business community, House 
Republicans rejected the draft. Fast track was defeated in 1994 and 
again in 1995 by the Republican-controlled House.153 
Joining Republican opposition to fast track in this period were 
traditionally Democratic constituents. Labor unions organized in force 
146 Id. at 195. 
147 Id. at 196–97. 
148 Id. at 198. 
149 Id. at 198 (citing Interview by Cheran Devereaux with Brian Biernon, Legislative Assistant 
to Representative David Dreier (Mar. 1998)). 
150 Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, Gephardt Declares Against NAFTA Democrat Cites Threat to U.S. 
Jobs, BALT. SUN, Sept. 22, 1993, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-09-22/news/1993265014 
_1_gephardt-nafta-treaty. 
151 “The side agreements were unacceptable to Mr. Gephardt, which is why he opposed the 
final passage of NAFTA. So having that history under our belt, we then wanted to make sure that 
the fast-track language in 1994 and thereafter was much more specific about what constituted an 
acceptable conclusion.” Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 200 (citing Interview by Cheran 
Devereaux with Mike Wessel, Trade Advisor to Rep. Richard A. Gephardt (Mar. 1998)). 
152 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 198. 
153 Id. at 202–204. 
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against a 1997 fast-track effort, claiming that job loss was directly 
attributable to the enactment of NAFTA. 154  In addition, several 
environmental organizations that had supported NAFTA in 1993 now 
switched sides to oppose fast track legislation. Steven Shimberg of the 
National Wildlife Federation gave testimony to the House 
Subcommittee on Trade to that effect: 
We recognized the potential of trade as an instrument to 
enhance environmental protection, and believed that NAFTA 
was a good first step toward the integration of trade and 
environment. . . . Based on our experience with NAFTA and 
with other trade and investment agreements, we now know we 
can no longer rely solely on side agreements to achieve our 
environmental objectives, or on fast track rules which do not 
state explicit goals for environmental protection.155 
The major push in 1997 on the part of the Clinton administration and 
lobbyists from business to renew fast track failed yet again. House 
Democrats refused to support a bill that did not “use the power of trade 
sanctions to keep developing nations from lowering labor and 
environmental standards to win in the global marketplace.”156 
In 2001, with a Republican president in the White House, new fast 
track legislation was once again proposed, though this time repackaged 
with the new name of ‘Trade Promotion Authority.’ While the bill did 
include labor and environmental standards in its outline of negotiating 
goals for U.S. trade agreements, these goals were not required for a 
negotiated agreement to receive ultimate approval from Congress.157 In 
July of 2002 the “Bipartisan” Trade Promotion Authority was finally 
passed, with eighty-eight percent of Republicans supporting the 
measure as compared with twelve percent of Democrats.158 
Under this 2002 Authority, the Bush Administration entered into 
trade agreements with Singapore, Chile, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, 
as well as a group of Central American countries under DR-CAFTA.159 
154 Id. at 207. 
155 Implementation of Fast Track Authority: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 229 (1997) (testimony of 
Steven J. Shimberg, vice president for Fed. and Int’l Affairs, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n). 
156 Alison Mitchell, Clinton Retreats on Trade Power; Prospects Slight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 
1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/11/world/the-trade-bill-the-overview-clinton-retreats-on-
trade-power-prospects-slight.html. 
157 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 229–30. 
158 Id. at 231. 
159 Free Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
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Continued opposition from the Democratic Party meant that these 
agreements relied on the Republic majority to pass the yes-no 
ratification vote. The Administration was in the process of negotiating 
four further trade agreements—with South Korea, Panama, Colombia 
and Peru—when Democrats took control of Congress in January of 
2007. 160  There was little hope of these agreements receiving 
Congressional approval—even just via a down-up vote—without 
concessions for labor and environment. 
2. May 10 Agreement 
U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab and President Bush entered 
into lengthy negotiations with the House Democrats, represented by 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer. 
These negotiations centered on the desired labor and environment 
objectives.161 The Democrats made it clear that the additional provisions 
had to be incorporated into the main text of the negotiated treaties, not 
added in a side agreement as they had been with NAFTA when 
President Clinton gained control in 1993.162 During this time, House 
Ways and Means Committee Chair Charles Rangel announced that there 
was “‘no question’ that a deal must include a provision that would 
obligate countries to uphold their obligations under multilateral 
environmental agreements.”163 
The resulting May 10 “Bipartisan Trade Deal” functioned as the 
blueprint for the U.S.-Peru TPA discussed at length in Sections II and 
III above. The Agreement was hailed as both a “victory for Democrats” 
and a “shrewd compromise by the White House.” 164  The Bush 
Administration hoped that this agreement would mean that Democrats, 
largely anti-trade since the days of NAFTA, could be counted on to 
support trade deals in the future. Officials from both parties expressed 
hope that the May 10 Agreement could be “a template for all trade 
160 Fact Sheet Latin American and Korean Free Trade Agreements Vital to U.S. Economy and 
Security, EMBASSY U.S. SEOUL KOR. (Oct. 12, 2007), http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p_413_1012fs. 
html. 




164 Steven Weisman, Bush and Democrats in Accord on Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/business/11trade.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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deals” beyond the four at issue.165 Pelosi announced, “where it comes 
down to labor standards and environment, this is enormous progress.”166 
B. Negotiation Theory and Environmental Priorities of Trade 
Agreements 
Free trade Republicans and the business interests they represented 
fought a long battle against their pro-labor and environment Democratic 
counterparts. Clearly, simple electoral politics is one of the biggest 
reasons for the existence of the May 10 Agreement and the U.S.-Peru 
FTA provisions that it shaped. Public opinion had selected more trade-
skeptical leaders to define the negotiating objectives of the U.S. 
government in Congress. To understand some of the other factors that 
played a role in this ideological battle, this paper now turns to 
negotiation theory. 
1. Theory of Two-Level Games 
A better understanding of just how the environmental provisions of 
these trade and investment agreements are determined can be gained by 
borrowing the now famous conceptual framework of Robert Putnam. In 
1988, Putnam proposed that the interaction of international diplomacy 
and domestic politics can be described as a two-level game: “At the 
national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of 
foreign developments.”167 In Putnam’s terminology, the “Level I” game 
occurs between the lead negotiators in the international arena. This 
could be the United States Trade Representative and his Peruvian 
counterpart, if we take the U.S.-Peru TPA as our example. The “Level 
II” game occurs when these leaders bring the negotiated agreement back 
home and there is a separate discussion among the various domestic 
constituents about whether or not to endorse the agreement.168 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Putnam, supra note 98, at 434. 
168  While Putnam’s article concerned international agreements generally, not just those 
dealing with trade, his quote from Robert Strauss illustrates this point well: “During my tenure as 
Special Trade Representative, I spent as much time negotiating with domestic constituents (both 
industry and labor) and members of the U.S. Congress as I did negotiating with our foreign 
trading partners.” Putnam, supra note 98, at 433 (citing Robert S. Strauss, Foreword to THE 
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These games do not necessarily occur in sequence. The estimated 
Level II preferences are ever-present in the minds of the Level I 
negotiators, knowing that they cannot reach an agreement among 
themselves that will fail to be ratified when brought home. In the U.S. 
system, the basic Level II game occurs when Congress must vote on 
whether or not to ratify a treaty. However, there are many domestic 
determinants of foreign policy, and each member of Congress is 
influenced by a wide range of constituents. Interest group lobbying, 
upcoming elections, and political party preferences are all 
considerations in the overall Level II game. 
In international negotiation, the Level I players deliver a negotiated 
agreement to their home legislatures that must be accepted as a whole, 
or rejected entirely. Any desired amendment at Level II, however 
minor, sends the entire agreement back to the Level I drawing board for 
re-negotiation. With U.S. trade agreements this process is formalized by 
the passage of “Fast Track” authority, more recently called Trade 
Promotion Authority. Under this legislation, USTR is given the 
authority to negotiate a trade agreement that, so long as it meets certain 
minimal requirements outlined by Congress, will be subject to a simple 
up-or-down vote for ratification. In this framework, Putnam calls all the 
possible Level I agreements that could receive ratification at Level II a 
“win-set.”169 
2. Why MEAs? 
A key question that arises when considering the May 10 Agreement 
is: Why did the House Democrats define their environmental agenda 
with reference to pre-existing multilateral environmental agreements? 
An alternative could have been to draft minimum environmental 
standards that became obligatory on the FTA partner. There are several 
possible explanations for the use of MEAs in this fashion. 
Firstly, reference to an already-negotiated agreement makes the Level 
I negotiation more manageable. A “take it or leave it” approach to the 
minimum environmental requirements means that Level I negotiators do 
not expend resources negotiating environmental details in addition to 
the topics traditionally covered by trade agreements, including tariff 
reductions and stances on intellectual property rights. If the parties 
TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: A CASE STUDY IN BUILDING 
DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR DIPLOMACY vii (1987)). 
169 Putnam, supra note 98, at 437. 
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undertook to negotiate substantive binding environmental provisions 
from scratch, the negotiation process might never conclude. 
The second explanation emerges from Putnam’s theory that “the 
relative size of the respective Level II win-sets will affect the 
distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain.”170 This 
means that the wider the perceived range of agreements that will be 
accepted at the Level II game, the more the Level I negotiator can be 
forced to compromise to reach agreement. As a result, it is 
advantageous for the United States to demonstrate to its potential treaty 
partners that Congress will not budge on certain issues—including the 
environment. The May 10 Bipartisan Agreement, which listed the 
original seven MEAs in 2007, was such a signal. The Agreement was 
not only a negotiation directive to USTR, it was also a public document 
meant to be read by Peruvian negotiators so they knew not to fight hard 
against the enforcement of the MEAs. There is a bargaining advantage 
to having a document that lists the environmental hard lines of the 
United States. Reference to the MEAs facilitated this signaling. 
A third reason for integration of the MEAs is legitimacy. A former 
USTR official stated in an interview that MEAs were used because 
Congress was looking for international agreements that had the same 
kind of consensus as the ILO Principles: “We needed this to know what 
the right kind of international environmental obligations would be.”171 
The United States appears as less of an aggressor to the sovereignty of 
its developing country trading partner if it asks for that country to 
enforce obligations already willingly agreed to in previous treaties. 
Inter-Level II negotiation is a fourth explanation. The Democratic 
Party knows that its voting base cares about the environment, though 
neither the Congressmen nor most of the constituents that vote for them 
are experts on the environment. Voters look to groups like the Sierra 
Club to tell them which issues are important and educate them on which 
politicians are “pro-environment.” Especially in the context of trade 
agreements, where the large number of issues can pull in multiple 
directions, the “asks” of interest groups must remain simple and easy to 
communicate. Reference to an environmental treaty is a simple way to 
package a long list of obligations. 
170 Putnam, supra note 98, at 440. 
171 Interview with Former U.S Trade Representative Official (Mar. 2014). 
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3. Why Trade Agreements? 
A repeated opposition to the inclusion of labor and environmental 
provisions in free trade agreements is that they do not belong there, 
which is sometimes articulated as, ‘leave tariff reductions to trade 
agreements and negotiate environment laws in environmental treaties.’ 
The chief of staff for a Republican Congressmen in the era of the 1994 
fast track vote said as much: 
We have contended all along that there is no reason to have 
[labor and environmental provisions] in fast-track legislation, 
because the administration already has the authority to negotiate 
labor and environmental agreements. . . .We can do the same 
thing as in NAFTA where those issues were handled outside the 
scope of the actual treaty.172 
a. Issue Linkage 
In his influential article, Putnam wrote that understanding “issue 
linkage[s] is absolutely crucial to understanding how domestic and 
international politics can become entangled.” 173  Issue linkage is 
fundamental to the success of modern trade agreements, and was crucial 
in the long debate over the passage of Trade Promotion Authority. An 
example is useful in understanding how linkages work: suppose some 
majority of Level II players are opposed to a certain policy (say 
liberalized trade, because of fears of job loss). However, some number 
of these players could be convinced to change their stance in exchange 
for progress on another issue that they care about (increased global 
environmental regulation, for example). This trade-off could never 
occur at the Level II bargaining table alone, because while the U.S. 
government can lower its own tariff barriers, it cannot unilaterally 
regulate pollution in Mexico. 
The explanation, from a negotiation perspective, for why interest 
groups fight to have environmental provisions in trade agreements 
comes from the political realities in both the Level I and Level II games. 
At Level II, interest groups know that their issues are far more likely to 
get approval if they are tied as a package with an issue the majority 
strongly supports. The environmental community knew that House 
Republicans would not vote “no” on the set of four upcoming FTAs that 
included Peru. Their successful passage was too important to their 
172 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 200 (citing an Interview by Charan Devereaux with Don 
Carlson, Chief of Staff for Representative Bill Archer (Mar. 1994)). 
173 Putnam, supra note 98, at 446–47. 
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business constituents to be derailed by the inclusion of unwanted 
environmental provisions. Environmental NGOs know that they are 
much more likely to get environmental provisions in an FTA passed 
than a freestanding international agreement on the environment. “Look 
at the track record with regard to Congressional approval of treaties,” a 
USTR official said. “Congress is much more likely to sign on to a trade 
agreement than a multilateral environmental treaty.”174 
Issue linkage also plays a crucial role at the Level I game. The 
legalization of environmental provisions in international economic 
treaties was discussed at length above. There, it was observed that 
though Peru had already signed on to CITES, it had failed to pass 
measures to enforce its requirements. Peru eventually signed on to the 
“stick” of binding and enforceable forestry measures because it was also 
promised the “carrot” of liberalized trade with the United States. 
Devereaux et al. observed a similar linkage occurring around the union 
lobby for labor provisions in fast track. While Republicans argued that 
“labor talks belong at institutions like the International Labor 
Organization . . . [u]nions disagreed, noting that workers have no 
leverage at the ILO because the organization lacks the power to enforce 
its conventions.” 175  “We want the same kind of binding dispute 
resolution for our concerns that business gets for things like intellectual 
property rights and investment rules,” said union policy analyst Thea 
Lee. “Businesses understand, as we do, that you use the leverage of a 
trade agreement to obtain promises from your lending partners to 
improve their laws.”176 
Issue linkages can occur because a coalition of Level II constituents 
hold the ratification of the agreement hostage while demanding 
concession on their individual special interest. Of course, this 
phenomenon can also occur in votes on solely domestic legislation. 
However, it is more likely to occur in the international trade context. 
“People are looking for tools,” said a USTR negotiator in an interview, 
“[We are in the process of negotiating a] BIT with China, and it’s the 
only treaty being debated with China at the moment, so a lot of people 
want to pack a lot into it.”177 People want every issue they have with 
China solved through this one BIT because it is the only treaty on the 
table. 
174 Interview with U.S. Trade Representatives Official (Mar. 2014). 
175 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 208–09. 
176 Id. at 209. 
177 Interview with U.S. Trade Representative Official (Mar. 2014). 
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b. Bilateral Bargaining 
The bilateral nature of the FTAs in question is a further reason why 
environmental special interest groups seek action through FTAs rather 
than MEAs. Salacuse provides two explanations for why the number of 
bilateral investment treaties has steadily risen even while attempts to 
form a global Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”) have 
repeatedly failed.178 Firstly, a negotiation of an agreement between two 
parties is far less complicated than a negotiation between multiple 
parties.179 The technical difficulties of accommodating all party interests 
have stalled the creation of an MAI. Secondly, the political realist 
explanation for the ‘success’ of bilateral agreements is that these FTAs 
are typically negotiated between a wealthy and powerful country and a 
weaker country still in the process of development. 180  This power 
asymmetry results in the developed nation coercively achieving most of 
its objectives.181 The developing country sees itself as having more to 
gain from an FTA relative to its partner, and thus more to lose if the 
negotiation fails.182 
In a multilateral negotiation, however, the weaker nations are able to 
ally themselves into coalitions to block the objectives of the powerful 
nation(s).183 Therefore, it is easier for the Level I negotiator to get 
concessions from Peru when he is negotiating with just Peru. In a 
multilateral setting, Peru could ally itself with other countries and form 
an oppositional coalition to resist binding environmental commitments, 
or perhaps suggest environmental issues that the U.S. does not want to 
consider (like action on climate). Indeed, such a situation is occurring in 
the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, discussed below. 
c. BITSs v. FTAs as Vehicles for Environmental Linkage 
Now we turn to the question of why, from a negotiation and process 
perspective, there has been more progress on environmental provisions 
in free trade agreements than bilateral investment treaties. One key 
factor is that the United States already has an open and secure 
178 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
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School) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
183 Salacuse, supra note 178, at 464. 
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investment climate for foreign investors, and so it has less to offer in a 
BIT negotiation than it does in an FTA. The U.S. has less bargaining 
power to make its negotiating partners accept unpopular environmental 
provisions in BIT negotiations. Another factor is that the Level II 
ratification process is different for BITs than for FTAs, meaning 
different considerations for players who must weigh domestic politics in 
the negotiation process. BITs, as international treaties, must receive 
approval from two-thirds of the Senate, rather than a majority of both 
the Senate and the House, as is required for the implementing legislation 
of TPAs.184 For this reason, the president does not need to seek Trade 
Promotion Authority before he enters into negotiations with another 
country.185 This means that in pursuing a completion of a BIT, 1) there 
are a smaller number of politicians for special interest groups to 
persuade and 2) the time window for coalition forming and Level II 
negotiation is smaller. 
4. Coalitions 
a. Level II Coalitions 
In Putnam’s universe, the key to winning the Level II game is by 
forming a coalition among domestic constituents that together have the 
strength to refuse to accept any Level I agreement that does not meet the 
objectives of the group. This theory explains well the story of the 
evolution of environmental objectives in free trade agreements. The fast 
track vote preceding NAFTA in 1991 and the vote on NAFTA itself, 
“split” the environmentalists.186 The Sierra Club and Friends of the 
Earth opposed it. 187  Greenpeace wrote that “even by modest 
expectations . . . [the side agreements] would have to be judged a 
complete failure.”188 On the other side, the Environmental Defense 
184  SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2013). 
185 MEREDITH BROADBENT & ROBBINS PANCAKE, REINVIGORATING THE U.S. BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATY PROGRAM: A TOOL TO PROMOTE TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
10 (2012), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/120629_Broadbent_ReinvigoratingBIT_W 
eb.pdf. 
186 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 195. 
187 Gary Lee, ‘Fast Track’ Sprint: Frenzied Lobbying on a Treaty Not Yet Written, WASH. 
POST, May 23, 1991, at A21; Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 195–196. 
188 William P. Avery, Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 281 (1998) 
(citing GREENPEACE, NAFTA: TRADING AWAY TOMORROW, GREENPEACE 4 (1993)). 
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Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Nature 
Conservancy decided to support NAFTA.189 
The Bush Administration fostered this fractioning in order to avoid a 
strong Level II coalition that would push for more binding 
environmental commitments. “NAFTA was a hard process,” said one 
veteran of that time. “The Environmental Groups were set against one 
another during the negotiations of the NAFTA side agreements. Eight or 
nine were allowed to give input on the negotiations in exchange for not 
opposing the final outcome. This ostracized the Sierra Club and Public 
Citizen.”190 Level II coalitions had to make a choice on whether or not 
to engage with the policy makers and try to shape the trade agenda in a 
pro-environment way, or to oppose the measure altogether. When 
leaders from the Nature Conservancy and other groups met with 
President Bush to discuss NAFTA objectives, Ralph Nader issued a 
public letter accusing them of “selling out.”191 All of the labor groups 
and some of the environmental groups stood strong in their opposition 
to NAFTA, while certain others thought that the side agreements had 
made enough progress to play along. The leader of the National Wildlife 
Federation (“NWF”), Jay Hair, wrote an op-ed supporting NAFTA in 
the Washington Post that called the 1991 fast track compromise 
“considerable progress.”192 
The environmental groups that remained firm in their opposition 
knew that their position was doomed once their coalition had been 
broken. “‘At the very least,’ said a spokesperson for the Friends of the 
Earth, ‘we expected the big environmental groups to stay on the fence. 
Hair’s endorsement was strong enough to hurt our position.’”193 Hair, of 
the NWF, later declared that environmental opponents of NAFTA “put 
their narrow political agenda ahead of the broad public interests.”194 
Many of the environmental groups would come to regret siding with 
the pro-NAFTA coalition. Ironically, NWF was one of the most vocal 
opponents to future fast track authorization. In 1997, a representative 
testified that, “we can no longer rely . . . on fast track rules which do not 
189 Six Environmental Organizations Back NAFTA, Denounce Opponents, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 
Sept. 17, 1993; Lee, supra note 187. 
190 Interview with leader from large environmental nonprofit (Mar. 2012). 
191 Lee, supra note 187; Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 195–196. 
192 Jay D. Hair, An Environmental Vote, WASH. POST, May 22, 1991, A20. 
193 Fredrick W. Mayer, Negotiating NAFTA: Political Lessons for the FTAA, in GREENING 
THE AMERICAS NAFTA’S LESSONS FOR HEMESPHERIC TRADE 101 (2002). 
194 Six Environmental Organizations Back NAFTA, Denounce Opponents, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 
Sept. 17, 1993. 
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state explicit goals for environmental protection.” 195  Environmental 
groups made this opposition clear to the Democrats in the House 
throughout the period between NAFTA and the 2007 Bipartisan 
Agreement. In July 2006, DR-CAFTA had passed the House by just two 
votes, with 187 out of 202 Democrats voting “no.”196 The eventual May 
10 victory was a result of the Democratic/Labor/Environment coalition 
holding strong to the binding provisions that they had been seeking 
since 1991. In the words of one Hill staffer, “All in all, there is not one 
issue in which the Democrats caved to the White House. This was one 
of the best showings of spine by Democrats in Congress” in four 
years.197 
b. Transnational Coalitions 
Putnam also introduced the concept of “transnational coalitions,” 
whereby a “Level I negotiator may find silent allies at his opponent’s 
domestic table. . . . Thus transnational alignments may emerge, tacit or 
explicit, in which domestic interests pressure their respective 
governments to adopt mutually supportive policies.”198 These cross-
border coalitions developed throughout the negotiations of FTAs. One 
year before the final U.S.-Peru TPA was concluded, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council teamed up with two NGOs from Peru to sue 
the U.S. Government in the U.S. Court of Trade.199 The suit alleged that 
the U.S. government facilitated the violation of CITES by allowing 
inspectors to look the other way when illegal wood imports entered the 
United States.200 The case was dismissed but the groups continued to 
lobby for forestry regulation in the U.S.-Peru TPA. 201  The anti-
environment coalition had similar allegiances. One House Republican 
195  The Implementation of Fast Track Trade Negotiating Authority: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 229 (1997) (statement of 
Steven J. Shimberg, Vice President for Federal and International Affairs, National Wildlife 
Federation). 
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pb07-5.pdf. 
197 Defeating the Bush Trade Agenda, DAILY KOS (May 12, 2007), http://www.dailykos.com/ 
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198 Putnam, supra note 98, at 444. 
199 Thomas Russell, Groups File Suit Over ‘Contraband’ Mahogany, FURNITURE TODAY 
(July 10, 2006), http://www.furnituretoday.com/article/360476-groups-file-suit-over-contraband-
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201  Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Peruvian Winner of 2007 Goldman 
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recalled, “what we heard from the Canadians and the Mexicans was that 
the [Clinton] administration was attempting to portray Congress as 
demanding side agreements that were enforceable by sanctions. For 
much of that year, Republican members actually consulted more closely 
with the Mexicans and Canadians than they did with the Clinton 
administration. The staff members were having meetings saying ‘Don’t 
believe [the administration].’”202 
5. Why these MEAs? 
One particular, and unusual, Level II coalition played a major role in 
the 2007 Amendments to the already negotiated U.S.-Peru TPA: the 
allegiance between the U.S. timber lobby and environment groups. 
Crucially, these groups were already united and motivated around the 
passage of a separate law, the 2008 amendment to the Lacey Act, which 
unanimously passed the House Committee on Natural Resources in 
October of 2007.203 The strangeness of the bedfellows behind this law is 
well demonstrated by an introduction to an NRDC article on the issue: 
“Name an environmental law strongly supported by both Republicans 
and Democrats, America’s timber industry, purchasers of wood 
products, labor unions, and environmental organizations. Stumped?”204 
The Lacey Act was first passed in 1900 to combat illegal poaching of 
game. The 2008 Amendment expanded its scope to cover illegal logging 
in the global timber industry. The existence of this “ready-made 
coalition” is a partial explanation for not only why CITES was included 
on the list of seven required MEAs in the May 10 Agreement, but also 
why such a disproportionate effort was spent on its enforcement in the 
U.S.-Peru TPA.205 One tenth of the text of the May 10 agreement is 
spent detailing the mandate to “USTR to conclude an Annex to the FTA 
covering forest sector governance and operations in Peru.”206 
As one insider to the process noted, figuring out how certain 
provisions make it into a trade agreement over others often involves 
202 Devereaux et al., supra note 11, at 198 (citing Interview by Charan Devereaux with David 
Dreier (Mar. 1998)).  
203 Press Release, Sen. Ron Wyden, Combat Illegal Logging Legislation Passes Senate (Dec. 
14, 2007), available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/combat-illegal-logging-
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asking which provisions were opposed the least, rather than championed 
the most. 207 Leading up to the May 10 Agreement, environmental 
groups had been fighting for the inclusion of all MEAs, not just the 
seven that eventually made it on to the list.208 According to House 
Democrat Lloyd Doggett, a March 2007 proposed TPA agreement had 
included no such limitation to the covered agreements.209 
VI. LOOKING AHEAD: ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS IN MEGA-TREATIES 
The inclusion of international environmental obligations within the 
text of international trade and investment agreements has received 
increased popular attention with the rise of U.S. participation in “mega 
treaties.” The Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) is a trade agreement 
currently under negotiation between the United States, Canada, and ten 
other countries around the Pacific Rim.210 The negotiation of the TPP 
has gone through twenty-one rounds since it was kicked off in 2010.211 
The 2013 deadline for completion was missed, though the Ministers and 
Heads of Delegation for the parties issued a statement in February 2014 
that all were “committed to concluding as soon as possible.”212 The 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“T-TIP”) is a proposed 
free trade agreement between the European Union and the United 
States. Negotiations for the agreement began in July 2013 and both 
parties have indicated that a final agreement could come as early as 
2015.213 There has been controversy over the environmental impact of 
both agreements, particularly the TPP. 
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A. Trans-Pacific Partnership 
The current parties to the TPP are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United 
States, and Vietnam.214 Numerous news agencies have reported that the 
United States has faced significant opposition from its partners in the 
negotiation of the Environment Chapter.215 The U.S. demand that the 
obligations in the environment chapter be subject to the same dispute 
settlement provisions as commercial violations has met with particular 
resistance.216 There are four challenges to reaching agreement on an 
aggressive environmental chapter: 1) the U.S. is seeking the most 
expansive environmental commitments sought in any free trade 
agreement to date; 2) some parties to the TPP are seeking commitments 
on climate, a particularly challenging issue in domestic U.S. politics; 3) 
Trade Promotion Authority expired at the end of 2007 and has yet to be 
renewed; and 4) the TPP is a multilateral rather than bilateral arena. 
1. Expansion of Environmental Objectives 
USTR has indicated that it considers the May 10 Agreement to be its 
“marching orders” on environment, despite the fact that the Trade 
Promotion Authority it was written to amend expired at the end of 
2007.217 A January 2014 Wikileaks release of the draft text of the 
Environment Chapter indicates that this is mostly true. The U.S. 
proposal includes commitments to the list of seven original MEAs, 
though whether or not all of those commitments would be binding is 
unclear—and controversial. 218  The United States is calling for 
obligations to “adopt, maintain, and implement measures to fulfill 
specific MEAs . . . enforceable through the DS [dispute settlement].”219 
The leaked proposal includes obligations related to conservation of 
plants and wildlife that are similar to those required under the U.S.-Peru 
TPA. Most interesting is that, in addition to the measures seen in the 
Peru FTA, the U.S. proposal in the environment chapter lists desired 
obligations regarding “curbing . . . fisheries subsidies” and 
214 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov 
/tpp (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
215 Froman Tamps Down Expectations on TPP Environment Chapter, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 
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“preventing[ing] overfishing and overcapacity.”220 These environmental 
provisions go beyond the original measures of the May 10 Agreement. 
On February 20, 2014 a coalition of 122 Democrats from the House 
of Representatives sent a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Michael 
Froman reiterating their position that the TPP must include strong 
environmental measures.221 The letter was drafted in reaction to the 
leaked text of the Environment Chapter and concerns that U.S. 
negotiators had backed down on their goal to have all seven MEAs 
enforced by binding dispute resolution. “These commitments must be 
strong, binding and enforceable, and subject to the same dispute 
settlement procedures as the commercial chapters, including recourse to 
trade sanctions,” the letter stated.222 The letter also noted that because 
the current parties to the TPP make up more than one-third of the global 
fisheries catch, the Partnership “offers the opportunity to put in place a 
rules-based, sustainable fishery management system.” The suggestion 
that the trade agreement should be the tool for shaping a new global 
fisheries law goes significantly beyond the territory of the May 10 
Agreement by creating international environmental obligations without 
reference to an already negotiated MEA. 
2. Climate 
The Wikileaks text was followed in February 2014 by a second leak, 
which purported to summarize the U.S. counter proposal to the draft 
text made public the month before.223 One of the most striking edits was 
on the subject of climate change. The U.S. proposed to rename an entire 
chapter from “Trade and Climate Change” to “Transition to a Low 
Carbon Economy.” Text that originally read: “The parties . . . recognize 
the importance of implementation of their respective commitments 
under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) 
and related legal instruments,” was rewritten in the U.S. version as: 
“The Parties affirm the importance of moving towards low-emissions 
220 Froman Tamps Down Expectations on TPP Environment Chapter, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 
Nov. 22, 2013. 
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economies, and recognize the desirability of mutually supportive trade 
and emissions-reduction policies in this regard.”224 
It seems that TPP members have adopted the U.S. strategy of 
referencing commitments to multilateral environmental treaties in the 
text of trade agreements. In a reversal of roles, the U.S. balked at the 
inclusion of the UNFCCC. The USTR released a statement in response 
to the leak: 
As part of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, the United 
States is fully committed and actively working with our partners 
to negotiate an ambitious agreement in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The environment 
chapter of the TPP presents an opportunity to focus on making 
progress on key, regional conservation issues and issues where 
the nexus with trade is clear, such as in our proposals for the 
first-ever disciplines on fisheries subsidies, and commitments to 
combat wildlife trafficking and illegal logging.225 
The decade-old argument that had been repeatedly used to counter fast 
track authority—that certain (environmental) subjects do not belong in 
trade agreements—was now used by the Obama Administration to fight 
climate language in the TPP. 
3. TPA Remains Expired 
USTR negotiators at the Level 1 game may simply be “looking over 
their shoulder” at the Level II ratification challenge when they seek to 
avoid climate language. Climate change regulation remains an 
extremely controversial topic in domestic U.S. politics. The inclusion of 
climate commitments may be enough to rally opposition even among 
those Congressmen who would otherwise like to see the successful 
completion of the TPP. The fate of the Level II game for the TPP is both 
crucial and uncertain. To date, Trade Promotion Authority remains 
expired.226 While President Obama mentioned hopes for TPA in his 
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State of the Union speech in January, however its fate remains 
uncertain.227 
4. Multilateral Arena 
TPP success at the Level I game is more uncertain than previous 
trade agreements because it is the first one in a truly multilateral arena. 
The dynamics described by Salacuse to explain the prevalence of 
bilateral agreements over multilateral agreements are now working in 
reverse. The negotiation is more complicated because there are more 
players with more issues. More relevant is the fact that weaker nations 
can join together in their opposition rather than face off against the U.S. 
alone. The leaked consolidated text of the TPP Environmental Chapter 
indicates that ten countries—every TPP member except Malaysia—
currently oppose the U.S. in its desire to enforce certain MEAs via 
binding dispute settlement.228 
B. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“T-TIP”) 
presents a further unpredictable negotiation dynamic with regard to 
environmental issues. In this agreement, unlike the TPP, the United 
States is not facing off against a coalition of smaller developing 
countries, most of whom have weak environmental regulation. Instead, 
the U.S. is negotiating bilaterally with another powerful state—a 
powerful state with arguably more stringent domestic environmental 
regulation. A position paper summarizing the E.U. proposals for the T-
TIP “Trade and Sustainable Development” Chapter (the E.U. typically 
combines labor and environmental provisions into one chapter), was 
leaked in July 2013.229 The position paper listed a number of MEAs it 
wishes to include in T-TIP, four of which the U.S. is not a signatory to, 
and noted that they were “of particular importance in trade 
negotiations.”230 
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Despite their “importance,” the E.U. reportedly does not wish to see 
binding dispute settlement provisions in the chapter(s) dealing with 
labor and environment.231 Instead, the T-TIP should recognize “each 
Party’s right to define and regulate its own domestic levels of 
environmental and labor protection at the level deemed necessary.”232 
Inside U.S. Trade called the paper “further evidence of the discrepancy 
between the E.U.’s generally high aims and the degree to which any 
deal will actually have teeth.”233 
As discussed above in the section on the general E.U. approach to 
FTAs, the E.U. has a practice of incorporating the Kyoto Protocol and 
nonbinding commitments to counter climate change in the text of its 
FTAs. We have seen from the leaked TPP negotiations that the current 
U.S. Trade Representative wishes to avoid any mention of the word 
“climate.” What will happen when two economically powerful nations 
come to the negotiating table with different environmental agendas? 
Will the United States agree to hortatory language regarding climate 
change commitments, which would result in its most significant 
international obligation to date in that arena—or will the E.U. agree to 
scrap the mention of climate altogether? 
C. Current Consensus on Trade/Investment Linkages and the 
Environment: Has it Worked? 
There are valid arguments on both sides of the debate around the 
inclusion of binding environmental obligations in international 
economic agreements. Some see the linkage of trade and environment 
as a necessary counterweight to the harmful externalities of 
globalization. Others balk at the idea of American Sierra Club members 
telling Malaysians what they can and cannot harvest in their own 
country. They would insist it would be better for Malaysians to write 
environmental laws under their own sovereign power when they have 
the income to afford it. This difference in opinion brings us back to the 
introduction of the two competing theories of trade and environment 
linkages: the Environmental Kuznets Curve and the pollution haven 
hypothesis. 234  Before casting judgment on the legalization of 
environmental norms through economic treaties, one might want to 
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otherwise have been in those countries that signed on FTAs under the 
May 10 template? 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) recently 
conducted an assessment of the impact of the environmental provisions 
of trade agreements in four partner countries: Chile, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Peru. 235 The GAO observed that, while significant 
progress had been made in passing environmental laws and establishing 
environmental institutions,236 more progress was needed to ensure these 
laws were being adequately enforced: 
Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru continue to face 
environmental challenges, including limited technical capacity 
and enforcement resources. Chile has taken significant steps to 
meet its FTA obligations since 2009, while concerns remain 
about Peru’s capacity to enforce protection of endangered 
timber species and address emerging deforestation threats in the 
Amazon. . . . [Notably] the U.S.-Peru bilateral plan to address 
specific challenges in Peru’s forestry sector, lack[s] time frames 
and performance indicators to assess progress.237 
A previous GAO report on four other FTAs with Jordan, Chile, 
Singapore, and Morocco was released in 2009. 238  While these 
agreements did not have nearly as ambitious environmental provisions, 
the GAO observed that, while significant progress had been made on 
lowering tariffs and increasing government transparency, progress on 
the environmental objectives was less successful: 
The selected partners have improved their environmental laws 
and made other progress, such as establishment of an 
environmental ministry and a 400-strong environmental law 
enforcement force in Jordan, according to U.S. and foreign 
officials. However, partner officials report that enforcement 
remains a challenge, and U.S. assistance has been limited. 
Elements needed for assuring partner progress remain absent. 
Notably, USTR’s lack of compliance plans and sporadic 
monitoring, State’s lax management of environmental projects, 
and U.S. agencies’ inaction to translate environmental 
235 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-161, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: OFFICE 
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ITS MONITORING OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS (2014). 
236 Id. at 10–12. 
237 Id. at 39. 
238 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-439, FOUR FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
GAO REVIEWED HAVE RESULTED IN COMMERCIAL BENEFITS, BUT CHALLENGES ON LABOR 
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commitments into reliable funding all limited efforts to promote 
progress.239 
These observations are echoed in much of the literature reviewing the 
success of the NAFTA environmental side agreements.240  The key 
criticisms are that the U.S. government neglected to take the initiative to 
investigate and enforce compliance of the environmental obligations 
and that there was insufficient allocation of funds to assist in 
environmental compliance. Gallagher notes that, while Article 22 of 
NAFTA provides for a dispute resolution process with punitive 
measures against a party that has “persistently fail[ed] to enforce 
environmental law,” this Article has never been exercised.241 
Gallagher argues that environmentalists, instead of turning away 
from free trade entirely, should instead push for increased participation 
of developed countries to support (financially and otherwise) the 
fledgling environmental institutions of developing nations. “During the 
NAFTA debates the international community ‘demanded’ that Mexico 
do more to protect its environment, but only ended up allocating a paltry 
$3 million per annum to that end.”242 A former USTR official expressed 
the same sentiment: “On the cooperation dimension it’s important that 
adequate funding is provided. We need the resources to provide both a 
carrot and a stick.”243 
The increased resources spent on implementing domestic reforms in 
order to come into compliance with a BIT or FTA are necessarily not 
being spent elsewhere within the developing state. Is it a good idea to 
allow the U.S. and E.U. to set the environmental priorities of other 
nations? One view may be that the support provided for the 
implementation of these environmental laws can only help bolster 
environmental governance in the trade partner. However, a competing 
view is that these reforms displace those that would have otherwise 
developed in a grassroots fashion spearheaded by stakeholders on the 
ground. Rodrik has shown that the process of meeting the requirement 
for integrating into an economic system, like the WTO or NAFTA, can 
be extremely costly for a developing nation.244 The cost of compliance 
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with external norms can “crowd out” other government spending 
priorities, such as education and public health.245 
An analogy can be made to the question of whether the availability of 
international arbitration helps or hurts the development of the domestic 
adjudication system of a host state. Ginsburg, using empirical analysis, 
finds that the dispute resolution provided for under bilateral investment 
treaties are substitutes, rather than complements, for domestic 
institutions, and lead to overall reductions in the quality of governance 
over time.246 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The practices presented in this paper can be seen as great 
achievements of negotiation and diplomacy. The domestic 
environmental lobby in the U.S. has been successful in shaping an 
international legal mechanism that has the power to counter at least 
some of the harmful environmental impacts of trade liberalization. The 
obligation, precision, and enforcement of otherwise weak multilateral 
environmental agreements and soft law principles are increased through 
a process of legalization of international environmental protection. 
These new environmental provisions increase the obligation upon states 
to create and enforce environmental laws; they often describe, with 
great precision, just how these laws are to be implemented; and they 
increase the amount of delegation given to third parties to determine 
compliance and resolve disputes. 
These innovations could also be seen as a necessary broadening of 
the scope of international trade and investment law. Odumosu, for 
example, has argued that the investor state dispute settlement system, 
and ICSID in particular, lacks legitimacy because it is limited by its 
“single economic rationale for investment protection” that is unable, or 
unwilling, to take into account alternative interests.247 The recognition of 
environmental law in the text of BITs is an attempt by states to expand 
the interests that are, at the least, not trampled by international dispute 
resolution and, at the most, enforced by it. 
However, these linkages come with some cost, as can be seen from 
the presentation of the fallout over the implementation of the Forest 
Annex of the U.S.-Peru FTA. There are serious threats to state 
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sovereignty if powers such as the United States are able to use their 
economic might to force domestic legal action from their trade partners 
in areas that are only tangentially related to trade. It was no coincidence 
that CITES was the MEA enforced the most aggressively and the MEA 
that received the widest domestic U.S. support—from 
environmentalists, but also the American timber lobby. 
Peru’s enforcement of CITES following the signing of the FTA can 
be seen as proof that “economic interdependence can be leveraged to 
help manage real political conflict.” 248  However, one can wonder 
whether this “leverage” is, in fact, plain coercion and whether or not 
there is anything wrong with that (a legal realist would likely say no). 
The very fact that the incorporation of environmental obligations occurs 
more frequently, and to a great degree, in FTAs rather than in BITs tells 
a story. The United States is able to get more of what it wants in an FTA 
precisely because it has more to offer. BITs are less successful 
bargaining arenas partially because the U.S. already maintains an 
extremely open investment environment.249 
A further concern rising out of these trade/environment linkages is 
that international treaties may contain a package of provisions that 
individually would never be adopted through the democratic political 
processes of the states that ratify them. From one perspective, that 
insight represents the beauty of international negotiation: the interaction 
between Level I and Level II preferences leads to trade-offs (issue 
linkages) that could not otherwise have been achieved on the domestic 
level. A different take is that trade and investment agreements allow 
leaders to circumvent the Level II domestic process to the detriment of 
democracy and transparency. This concern was apparent in the rapid 
passage of the Peruvian Ninety-nine Decrees, claimed to be necessary to 
implement the Forest Annex of the U.S.-Peru TPA. 
It is clear that the question is not whether trade and environment are 
linked—because they are—but instead how to best promote global 
economic growth and a clean environment for the long term. As Destler 
writes, “[L]inking labor standards to trade agreements is entirely 
legitimate in a world where globalization is putting increased stress on 
domestic economic arrangements. . . . To say it is legitimate, of course, 
does not mean it is effective, at least in the near term.”250 
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